improve the living standards of children in America. Yet some critics believe that the United States has far to go in alleviating poverty among children and improving their access to health care. For example, even though infant mortality rates today are one-tenth their 1920s levels, American rates are significantly higher than those in many other developed countries. Further, significant concerns have been raised about racial differences in the access to public programs, in part because black infant mortality rates today remain substantially higher than those of whites (14.7 deaths per thousand live births versus 6.1).
The federal government's efforts to improve the welfare of black children in the South dates back to the Reconstruction Era. Yet as Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch argue in One Kind of Freedom, the Freedman's Bureau had modest success in providing relief and education for newly freed black children. The federal government's first broad-based effort to provide social welfare occurred during the New Deal, first through emergency assistance and then through the establishment of long-term programs such as Aid to Dependent Children and Social Security. In this paper we examine the effectiveness of various New Deal programs in improving the socioeconomic status of black and white children during the 1930s. We focus specifically on infant mortality.
Franklin Roosevelt and the Congress responded to the Great Depression by establishing a number of programs that potentially could have contributed to lowering infant mortality rates. As part of the New Deal, the federal government provided funds for direct relief and work relief through the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), and work relief under the Civil Works Administration (CWA) and eventually the Works Progress Administration (WPA). The Public Works Administration (PWA) was supposed to alleviate unemployment problems by providing additional employment, while enhancing the economy by building social capital, including sanitation projects in many cities. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) was designed to help raise the incomes of struggling farmers. Under the Social Security Act of 1935, the long-term programs for old-age assistance, aid to dependent children, and aid to the blind were established. Public housing was created to try to upgrade the quality of housing for families in slums. The administrators of all of these programs saw them as means to put resources into the hands of families in need, precisely the group where infant mortality was most likely to be a problem.
There has been some empirical controversy whether the stated goals of the New Deal-relief, recovery, and reform-were actually met. In studies of the distribution of funds across the states, Wright (1974) , Wallis (1998) , and Couch and Shughart (1998) , for example, show that the distribution of New Deal funds does not seem to fit a reform motive. Couch and Shughart (1998) question whether the funds were distributed in ways that promoted relief or recovery, claiming that the political agendas of the president and congressmen were more important determinants (see also Anderson and Tollison (1991) and Wright (1974) ). John Wallis (1998) , on the other hand, finds some evidence that New Deal money was distributed to areas with relatively higher unemployment. All of these discussions focus on the politics and economics of distributing federal largesse. Surprisingly, very little research has attempted to address the important question of how successful these programs were in reducing socioeconomic problems.
One means of measuring the success of federal relief programs during the New Deal is to examine their effect on infant mortality rates. Since children under the age of one are probably the societal group with the fewest defenses against the problems of disease, malnourishment, and maltreatment, they are probably affected most by negative socioeconomic shocks to the household. Infant mortality rates have been shown by numerous studies to be strongly associated with socioeconomic status broadly defined (see Antonovski and Bernstein (1977) , Clifford and Brannon (1978) , Fordyce (1976 /1977 ), and Waldman (1992 ). Because social insurance programs and relief programs are designed to help people in the lower end of the income distribution, their impact on the infant mortality rate is one important measure of their success. In fact, the social Area (1915 Area ( -1932 , the United States (1933 -1940 ), and Selected States (1915 -1940 Year Current birth registration area (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) Sources. U.S. data are from National Center for Health Statistics (1996) . The individual state data are from Linder and Grove (1947). programs of the New Deal might well have been extremely important. During the worst depression in American history, the infant mortality rate continued to decline through 1932, rose slightly in 1933 and 1934, and then declined sharply through the rest of the 1930s (see Table 1 ). Such a drop is surprising since we might expect that lower incomes would contribute to greater infant mortality, particularly if lower income influenced both prenatal care and nutrition and the degree of crowding in households.
Both black and white infant mortality rates followed similar patterns during the 1930s, although the black rate remained substantially higher and had larger fluctuations. Part of the difference probably stems from differences in household incomes, but there might also have been differential access to the benefits from the government programs. Federal New Deal administrators claimed that they sought to treat the races equally when they distributed funds. Many New Deal programs, however, were administered in partnerships with state and local officials, and there was plenty of room for local administrative discretion in the distribution of funds. Since state and local governments in the South had implemented policies that had significantly retarded black progress for decades (see, for example, Kousser (1974) , Higgs (1977) , Ransom and Sutch (1977) , and Margo (1990) ), there may well have been racial differences in the access to and subsequent effects of the New Deal. In this paper we describe the long-term infant mortality decline for both blacks and whites during the early 1900s, its continuation through the Great Depression, and the nature of New Deal programs. Using a sample of over 700 counties from the South with separate information for blacks and whites, we then examine the effect of New Deal spending on black and white infant mortality.
MORTALITY TRENDS
One of the most significant trends in America since 1850 has been the great mortality transition (Easterlin, 1996, Chap. 6) . Even more dramatic has been the decline in infant mortality for both white and black populations. In 1850, the expectation of life at birth (e(0)) in the United States was 38.3 years (39.5 for the white population), and the infant mortality rate (IMR: deaths before age 1 per 1,000 live births) was 229 (217 for whites) (Haines, 1998a, Table 1 ). The IMR for the black population (most of whom were slaves in 1850) may have been as high as 350 and the e(0) as low as 23 years (Steckel, 1986) . The mortality transition essentially began in the 1870s and was well underway by the turn of the century. In 1900 the expected life span at birth for the overall population was 50.1 (51.8 for whites and 41.8 for blacks). The corresponding IMR had fallen to 120 for the overall population (111 for whites and 170 for blacks) (Haines, 1998a, Table 1) .
A complex set of factors contributed to this achievement, including improvements in diet, nutrition, clothing, and shelter; expanded public health measures to provide clean water supplies, proper sewerage and refuse disposal, quarantine, pure milk, unadulterated food and drink, health education, and vaccinations and inoculations; improved health behavior (e.g., washing and personal hygiene, food preparation); medical advances; and even possibly exogenous changes in the virulence and etiology of specific diseases (e.g., scarlet fever). The improvements in infant mortality were assisted, in part, by the decline in fertility, which had proceeded throughout the 19th century (Haines, 2000; Meckel, 1990; Troesken, 1999) .
During the Progressive Era there was a heightened interest in controlling and reducing morbidity and mortality among infants, children, and mothers. For instance, the U.S. Children's Bureau was founded in 1912 "to investigate and report upon all matters pertaining to the welfare of children and child life among all classes of our people" (Bremner, 1971 (Bremner, , p. 1525 Lindenmeyer, 1997, Chap. 1) . Julia Lathrop, first head of the agency, "selected a noncontroversial issue, reducing infant mortality, as the agency's first project" (Lindenmeyer, 1997, p. 30) . The Bureau did much to promote measurement of levels, trends, differentials, and causes of infant mortality. For example, the Children's Bureau sponsored early studies (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) of matched birth-infant death records for several U.S. cities (see Woodbury (1926) ).
Perhaps more importantly, the Children's Bureau successfully lobbied for the extension of the Death Registration Area (DRA) and the Birth Registration Area (BRA). The original DRA included only the six New England states plus New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Indiana, and the District of Columbia. This preliminary set of states comprised only 26% of the American population, was more urban, had a higher proportion of the foreign born, and had relatively fewer blacks (4.4% of the U.S. total) compared to the nation as a whole. In addition, most of the blacks in the DRA were urban (82%), in contrast to the nation overall, where 20% of blacks were urban (Preston and Haines, 1991, Table 2 .1). It took even longer to form the BRA. It was put together in 1915 and consisted of the six New England states plus New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Minnesota, and the District of Columbia. Both the DRA and the BRA did not include the entire continental United States until 1933, when Texas was admitted. Thus, for the time period considered in this paper, the vital statistics coverage was not complete at the beginning of the period, although births, deaths, and infant deaths were reported for about 95% of the population by 1929 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975, p. 44) .
The Progressive Era saw great strides in the reduction of infant mortality. Between 1900 and 1920, the IMR declined by about 35%, from 111 to 82, for the white population and by about 29%, from 170 to 132, for the black population (Haines, 2000 , Table 3 ). The efforts of the progressives eventually led to the passage of the Sheppard-Towner Act in November 1921, which remained in effect until June 1929. The law appropriated about seven million dollars in federal money for grants-in-aid to states for the promotion of maternal and infant health and welfare (Bremner, 1971 (Bremner, , pp. 1003 (Bremner, -1025 Meckel, 1990, Chap. 8; Lindenmeyer, 1997, Chap. 4) . By 1930 the Children's Bureau had reported that the legislation led to, among other things, expansion of the BRA and the DRA, establishment of state child-hygiene bureaus and divisions, establishment of permanent state health centers for mothers and children, and, perhaps most important, an accompanying increase in state appropriations for infant and maternal health (U.S. Children's Bureau, 1930, pp. 1-3) . Thus, even though the Sheppard-Towner legislation had expired, much public health infrastructure was already in place by the late 1920s, both of a general sort-purification of water, improvements in the disposal of sewerage and refuse, quarantine, health education-and of a type that specifically assisted infants and mothers-milk pasteurization, vaccinations and inoculations, visiting nurses, maternal care, and education.
The IMR continued to decline through the 1930s. 3 As shown in Table 1 , between 1930 and 1940, the IMR for whites declined by 28% while that for blacks fell by 27%, although both rates rose somewhat between 1932 and 1934. The declines were virtually identical to the percentage declines of the 1920s (27% for each group). In the southern states of Virginia, South Carolina, and Mississippi (see Table 1 ), black and white infant mortality rates followed the national trends, although the levels were different from state to state.
Given that infant mortality tends to be correlated with socioeconomic status, the continuation of the downward trend for both blacks and whites during the 1930s is surprising because America experienced its most severe macroeconomic disturbance during that decade. Between 1929 and 1933, nominal GNP fell by 46% and real GNP by 30%. The unemployment rate rose from 3.2 to 24.9% of the civilian labor force (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975, Series F1,5, D 86) . The 1929 unemployment rate was not reached again until World War II, and the level of real GNP per capita in 1929 was not achieved until 1940. Thus, despite a horrendous downturn and a decade of lost economic growth, infant and maternal health improved, except for a short-lived jump upward in 1933 and 1934 during the trough of the Depression. Part of the improvement over the course of the decade may have stemmed from the continuation of practices that had been developed in the 1920s. Another possible reason might be that the federal programs under the New Deal helped sustain the earlier progress and helped prevent those struck hardest by the Depression from suffering too sharp a decline in their material well-being.
NEW DEAL PROGRAMS
Prior to the 1930s providing financial relief for people struck by misfortunepoverty, unemployment, injury, etc.-was not considered to be a federal responsibility. State and local governments provided varying degrees of aid through mothers' aid programs, poor relief, workers' compensation, and institutions for the blind and disabled. When the Depression hit, however, attitudes toward the federal role were altered, as people saw the Depression as a problem that was national in scope (Wallis, 1984) . The federal government began loaning funds for relief through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1932, during the Hoover Administration. Activity at the federal level exploded when Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic Congress established the New Deal in March 1933. A profusion of programs were established with goals ranging from direct relief, to employment, to the building of public works. The federal government spent approximately 5% of GDP on New Deal programs during the 1930s. This level of federal government spending during the 1930s was unprecedented and set the stage for a dramatic shift in the financial responsibilities of the national, state, and local governments. New Deal programs raised federal spending as a proportion of all government spending from 30% in 1932 to 46% in 1940 (Wallis 1984, pp. 141-142) . The Works Progress Administration (WPA), later the Works Projects Administration, superceded the FERA in the latter part of 1935 and provided work relief for "employables," while "unemployables" once again became the responsibility of local and state governments. The federal government still provided some direct relief for dependent children, the blind, and the elderly through programs established by the Social Security Act of 1935. The Public Works Administration built public works, while aiding the unemployed by providing construction employment and potentially some economic stimulus in the area. The Public Works Administration, in particular, might have had a more direct effect on public health because it contributed to the building of sewage control and waterworks facilities in hundreds of communities (Public Works Administration, 1939, pp. 139 -180) . The Public Works Administration and later the U.S. Housing Authority began building public housing projects that were designed to improve housing and reduce overcrowding in slum areas. Payments to farmers under the Rental and Benefit program and later the Conservation programs of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration were designed to increase farm incomes.
The North/South comparisons in Table 2 show that per capita federal New Deal spending tended to be smaller in the South than in the rest of the country for most programs. Thus, just by living in the South, blacks had access to a smaller share of New Deal spending. Part of the difference in spending across the country may have been driven by the fact that the South was less urban than the rest of the nation. Many of the relief programs were more focused on resolving issues related to urban unemployment. The South fared much better with respect to the AAA programs, although, as we will see below, the distribution of AAA funds might have contributed to greater income inequality and more problems for the disadvantaged.
THE DETERMINANTS OF INFANT MORTALITY
The costs and benefits of public programs are never distributed equally across society. During the 20th century the federal government seems to have been less discriminatory than southern states and local governments; therefore, we might expect that New Deal federal government programs were likely to provide more equal access to blacks and whites than the earlier state and local relief groups. The Federal Works Agency (1940, p. 23) argued that its programs-including the Public Works Administration and the Works Projects Administration-actively sought to ensure no racial discrimination in employment and in the distribution of benefits. Although the federal government may have attempted to create equal access to these programs based on race or socioeconomic status, its oversight was limited because nearly all of the programs were administered in conjunction with state and local authorities in some way. Thus, while the federal government may have been a positive force in aiding blacks in a number of situations, state and local governments in the South had developed policies that had significantly retarded black progress for decades (see, for example, Kousser (1974) , Higgs (1977) , Ransom and Sutch (1977) , and Margo (1990) ). Racial differences in program participation may also have led to an unequal distribution of program funds. Blacks with limited education may have faced more obstacles in determining their eligibility for relief programs. In addition, past experiences with local public programs may have discouraged them from applying.
Richard Sterner (1943, pp. 213-323) used various surveys to develop a complex picture of the extent to which black families participated in New Deal relief programs. There appear to have been racial differences in the participation in New Deal programs that varied across programs, and varied from state to state and probably from county to county within most programs. Sterner found from surveys in 1933 and 1935 that the share of the black population receiving relief was higher than the white share of the population in southern cities, but it was lower in southern rural areas. Black families seem to have fared the worst from the Aid to Dependent Children program, which was largely administered by state and local agencies. Lieberman (1998, p. 128) and Sterner (1943, pp. 282-286) found that the percentage of black children accepted for ADC in the late 1930s in nearly every southern state was smaller than the black percentage of children under age 16, even though black families were more likely to have low incomes. Meanwhile, ADC benefits per child recipient were lower for blacks than for whites.
In some cases the introduction of New Deal programs could have had perverse effects on low-income and minority populations. Warren Whatley (1983) has argued, for example, that sharecroppers and share tenants tended to be demoted to wage laborers as a result of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA). The AAA payments gave landlords incentive to displace tenants, even though the intent of the legislation was for tenants to share in the benefits of the farm programs. Since blacks were found more often at the lower end of the tenure ladder, they may have actually suffered from the introduction of the AAA.
Only limited race-specific information on the division of New Deal spending between black and white families is available (see Sterner (1943) ). However, we can draw some inferences by looking at how New Deal spending affected black and white infant mortality rates in the various counties of the United States. The various New Deal programs potentially might have reduced infant mortality by providing employment to the unemployed, in some cases by providing direct relief, by building sanitation projects, and by stimulating the economy either directly or indirectly with an influx of spending. To measure the impact of the New Deal, we developed a data set for over 700 counties with race-specific information on births and deaths throughout the 1930s. The regression model we estimate is relatively straightforward:
where IMR i is the infant mortality rate for race i (black or white), GFR is the general fertility rate for race i, ND is a group of variables describing New Deal spending per capita for various programs, X is a group of variables describing the economic and geographic characteristics of the counties, and e i is a set of race-specific stochastic error terms. We have race-specific information on the infant mortality rate and birth rates, but we do not have race-specific information on the other variables in the equation.
In addition to the New Deal programs, we are able to include several variables that capture key factors that might have influenced infant mortality. Geographic differences in infant mortality based on the ethnicity and/or racial mix of the population are captured in the regression with variables measuring the percentages of black and foreign-born individuals in each county. Racial and ethnic differences in infant mortality may have arisen from a disparity in the socioeconomic status of various population groups or cultural differences in the use of or access to medical care in different areas. Carson (1994) cites several studies showing that the foreign-born and southern blacks were much more likely to use midwives than were black and white women in northern cities. She also notes that there were substantial differences in blacks' and whites' access to hospitals. Moreover, since there was substantial residential segregation at the time, there were likely to be racial and ethnic differences in the extent of residential crowding and access to sanitation services, even within the same county.
The regression includes the percentage of the population living in urban areas (defined as residing in towns with more than 2,500 people) and rural, nonfarm areas. These variables capture the impact of greater population density and urbanization on the potential spread of epidemics among infants and on access to health care. To control for differences in the overall economic condition across the counties, we include retail sales per capita. This variable is designed to proxy personal income at the local level, which is not available.
We also included a measure of literacy because more highly educated families were likely to have better information about infant care and health, more generally. The census reported illiteracy for people aged 10 and above in 1930 and then reported the number of years of school completed for people over 24 years in 1940. We used the illiteracy rate from 1930 and then calculated illiteracy rates for 1940 for people over 24 years old. The 1940 estimate is based on 1947 information from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1948, p. 7) on the illiteracy of males and females over 24 who had no schooling and 1 to 4 years of schooling.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA SET
Infant deaths and births were collected from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1934a Census ( , 1934b Census ( , 1934c Census ( , 1936a Census ( , 1936b Census ( , 1938 Census ( , 1939 Census ( , 1940 Census ( , 1941 Census ( , 1942 . From 1930 to 1934 the information on births, deaths, infant deaths, and stillbirths was reported separately for towns and cities above 10,000 in population and for the rural sections of each county. We determined the counties in which each of the town and cities were located and then aggregated the rural and city information to the county level. In some cases cities were located in two counties. In situations where over 90% of the population of the city was in one county, we combined the city information with that county's information. In several other situations we combined counties. 5 We also had to combine a number of counties because of the way the New Deal information was reported. 6 Separate information for "colored persons" and whites was provided for between one-fourth of the counties in the early 1930s and one-third of the counties in the late 1930s. The counties with separate information were primarily located in the South. Colored persons includes some Asians and others who were not of African descent, although the vast majority of the nonwhites in the South were African-Americans. Our sample is limited to a subset of all southern counties for several reasons. In a number of counties, typically with populations that were less than 10% black, the Census did not report separate information for blacks and whites. In quite a few settings, the Census reported black and white information for the urban sector but not the rural sector of the county. Since the information on the determinants of infant mortality rates was reported for the entire county level, we felt that we should focus on the counties with full infant mortality information for the entire county. After ensuring that we had full information on infant mortality for blacks and whites for the southern counties, our sample includes 723 counties in the years 1930 to 1932, 845 counties in the years 1933 to 1935, and 1192 counties for the years 1936 to 1939. In the difference regressions, which compare the later years with the period 1930 to 1932, the sample is limited to the number of counties for which we have data in 5 Therefore, we combined Russell and Lee counties in Alabama (Phenix City); DeKalb, Fulton, Milton, and Campbell in Georgia (Atlanta); Edgcomb and Nash in North Carolina (Rocky Mount); and James City and York in Virginia (Williamsburg). 6 In Virginia we combined the following districts that were reported separately in the Census: Albemarle county and Charlottesville city; Allegheny county and Clifton Forge city; Augusta county and Staunton city; Campbell county and Lynchburg city; Dinwiddie county and Petersburg city; Elizabeth City county and Hampton city; Frederick county and Winchester city; Henrico county and Richmond city; Henry county and Martinsville city; James City county and Williamsburg city; Montgomery county and Radford city; Nansemond county and Suffolk city; Norfolk county with Norfolk city, South Norfolk city, and Portsmouth city; Pittsylvania county and Danville city; Prince George county and Hopewell city; Roanoke county and Roanoke city; Rockbridge county and Buena Vista city; Rockingham county and Harrisonburg city; Spotsylvania county and Fredericksburg city; Warwick county and Newport News city; Washington county and Bristol city; Arlington county and Alexandria city. the earliest period. One reason for the smaller number of observations in 1930 to 1932 is that Texas (253 counties) was not included in the BRA or DRA at this time.
Census information on population and many of the socioeconomic variables were derived from ICPSR data set 0003, as corrected by Michael Haines (ICPSR, 0003, no date). The information on the different New Deal programs was reported by the United States Office of Government Reports (the "Office"). In 1940 the Office compiled a detailed statistical description of the federal government's expenditures across the United States during the New Deal era. Data were collected on 31 different New Deal-era programs for 3,069 counties in the United States for the period March 1933 through June 1939. For each county, aggregate expenditures over the entire time period were reported for each of the programs. We focus our attention here on the spending programs that would have been most directly beneficial in preventing infant mortality, including the major work relief programs, Aid to Dependent Children, the AAA, and the PWA public works and public housing projects.
Although the Office reported information aggregated for the entire period from 1933 to 1939, we were able to use the reports of the various agencies to roughly identify the timing of the programs. This allowed us to break the New Deal spending into two time periods, 1933 through 1935 and 1936 through 1939 . In brief, the funds spent by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), the Civil Works Administration (CWA), and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration's (AAA) Rental and Benefits program were largely exhausted prior to 1936. The Social Security Aid to Dependent Children program, the Public Works Administration's (PWA) public housing program (later transferred to the U.S. Housing Authority), the AAA Conservation payments, and 95% of the WPA programs had their effects after 1935. We used a variety of sources to split the PWA public works programs into the two periods.
7 To translate the New Deal spending into per capita figures, we divided by the county's population in 1930. Given the timing of our information on the New Deal programs, we have created three time groupings, 1930 -1932, 1933-1935, and 1936 -1939 . For each period we summed the infant deaths and births and then calculated an infant mortality rate. When we calculated the general fertility rate for each race we used the number of women of each race aged 15 to 44 in the denominator. There was no New Deal spending in the 1930 -1932 period for the programs that we considered. We used the census information from 1930 and 1940 and straightline interpolations for the midpoint of each period (1931 for 1930 -1932, 1934 for 1933-1935, and 1937/38 for 1936 -1939) (1936, 1939) .
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
The analysis involves several steps. Given that many prior infant mortality studies have used cross-section regressions, the cross-sectional regressions for the three time periods are reported. We lack measures of some of the variables that might have influenced infant mortality, such as public health expenditures, hospitals, or household sanitation practices. We know that public health expenditures and access to medical care were important factors, and these varied substantially across states. In the cross-sectional regressions state dummy variables are included to control for differences in such variables as public health spending, state relief programs, cost of living, and other factors that were common to all counties in each state.
The state dummies, however, cannot control for unmeasured differences across counties. Numerous econometric studies have shown that mistaken inferences can be drawn by not controlling for unmeasured heterogeneity across the observations. As a step toward controlling for the unmeasured heterogeneity across counties, we use two separate difference regressions, one for 1933-1935 minus 1930 -1932 and another for 1936 -1939 minus 1930 -1932 . The difference regression helps control for factors that remained constant within the same counties over time but varied across counties. We are using 1930 -1932 as a base year without New Deal programs for the comparisons. In essence, the difference regressions are another method of controlling for fixed effects. We do not run differences for 1936 -1939 and 1933-1935 because for some of the New Deal programs like the PWA, which spent money in both time periods, we would have to make assumptions about the timing of the distribution of the funds. We avoided estimating the difference between 1936 -1939 and 1933-1935 because we did not want our results to be driven by our assumptions about the timing of the New Deal spending.
Finally, we worried about potential simultaneity bias in the estimates of the New Deal variables. That is, it is possible that increased infant mortality (or a slowing in the decline of infant mortality) might have been a signal used by New Deal administrators to deliver more funds for relief and employment. Therefore, in all of the regressions we use instruments for the New Deal programs to control for possible endogeneity. The instruments are predictions from regressions with a variety of economic and political variables similar to the ones used in the literature summarized by Wallis (1998) and Couch and Shughart (1998) . We estimated separate regressions for each program, with expenditures regressed on the following socioeconomic and political variables (for 1930 unless otherwise specified): the inverse of population, the percent black, the percent urban, the decline in retail sales from 1929 to 1933, the ratio of tax returns filed in 1935 to the population in 1930, the per capita value of farms, the percentage of land in farms, average farm size, the ratio of unemployed in 1930 to gainfully employed in 1930, the ratio of unemployed in 1937 to gainfully employed in 1930, mean and standard deviation of the percent voting Democrat from 1896 to 1932, the difference between the percent voting for Roosevelt in 1932 and the mean from 1896 to 1932, electoral votes per capita, percent voting in 1932, a series of variables describing representation on House committees during the 1930s, and a series of state dummy variables. We then used the predictions from these equations as instruments for the New Deal programs in the infant mortality regressions. The correlation between the instruments for the New Deal programs and the actual values are typically above 0.5, with the lowest correlation at about 0.37. 9 Since the instruments were all estimated using the same sets of correlates, we also examined the correlations between the instruments. The overwhelming majority of correlations were below 0.5 in absolute value. The highest correlation was between FERA and CWA (0.73). There was a 0.73 correlation between the FERA and WPA, but they do not appear in the same equations.
The inclusion of the birth rate in the infant mortality equation also creates potential endogeneity problems. Demographers have found a positive relationship between infant deaths and birth rates, which could be explained as either replacement or insurance (Haines, 1998b) . As couples seek a target family size, a baby lost in infancy would be replaced with another child. Alternatively, some 9 The correlations between the instruments and the actual per capita funds in the programs are FERA (0.64), WPA (0.74), PWA (0.37), CWA (0.68), SSA aid to dependent children (0.73), AAA programs (0.89), PWA housing (later USHA housing) (0.78). (1936, 1939) . The infant mortality data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1934a Census ( , 1934b Census ( , 1934c Census ( , 1936a Census ( , 1936b Census ( , 1937 Census ( , 1938 Census ( , 1939 Census ( , 1940 Census ( , 1941 Census ( , 1942 .
Note. Sample is restricted to southern counties.
families may have had more children as insurance against the future loss of a child. 10 To determine the relative effects of the birth rate variable, we have estimated a reduced-form version of the mortality equations that did not include the birth rate, and the results for the remaining variables, which are the focus of the study, are similar to those reported here. Table 3 reports summary statistics of New Deal spending for the various programs and of the socioeconomic measures in 1930 and 1940 for the southern sample of 723 counties used in the difference regressions. Comparisons of the southern sample with national averages for all counties show that the percent black and the percent illiterate are substantially higher in the southern sample. Meanwhile, nominal retail sales per capita, the percent foreign-born, the percent urban, and the percent rural-nonfarm were all substantially lower.
We ran OLS regressions and used White's (1980) method to correct the standard errors for potential heteroskedasticity. We chose OLS over a logit transformation of the infant mortality rate for ease of interpretation of the coefficients. Using a logit transformation does not affect the statistical inferences. Tables 4 and 5 show the results of cross-section regressions for 1930 -1932, 1933-1935, and 1936 -1939 for blacks and whites, respectively. The independent variables explain roughly 36% of the variation in 1930 -1932, 31% in 1933-1935, and 14% in 1936 -1939 in the black cross-section regressions. In contrast, the percentage of variation explained for the white observations rises to 39% by the last period. 11 The percentages explained by the variables in the regression are actually impressive given that we could not obtain county-level information on many factors that influence infant mortality, such as specific behaviors of families with small children, breast-feeding practices, use of hospitals, and access to other forms of medical care.
Most of the results are consistent with expectations about how various factors influence infant mortality. Black and white infant mortality rates were higher in areas where the illiteracy rate was higher, consistent with views that the absence of education contributed to an environment where small children were subject to greater illness. Black and white infant mortality rates were also higher in urban and rural nonfarm areas. It appears that in more densely settled regions the problems of contagion and/or public health issues with people living closer together were not overcome by extant sanitation practices or access to more doctors in more populated areas.
We included a measure of retail sales per capita as a proxy for consumption in 10 Haines (1998b) estimated a replacement effect in the United States of between one-fourth to one-third of a child per child death. For more discussion of the issue, see the edited volume by Montgomery and Cohen (1998) . 11 The R 2 values in regressions with only the state dummies were 0.295 for blacks and 0.128 for whites in 1930 -1932, 0.144 1930-1932 1933-1935 1936-1939 Coeff. Source. See Table 3 and the discussion of the New Deal instruments in the text. Note. The t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors using White's (1980) method. 1930-1932 1933-1935 1936-1939 Coeff. Source. See Table 3 and the discussion of the New Deal instruments in the text. Note. The t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors using White's (1980) method. these areas. Although many studies find an inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and infant mortality, we cannot reject the hypothesis that retail sales had no effect in either the black or the white regression. We also included the variable percent black as one means of examining the impact of the black group economy on infant mortality. A higher black percentage of the population was associated with lower black infant mortality rates. In the highly segregated southern society, access to hospitals and medical care was subject to discrimination. As the percentage black in a county rose, there was the potential for a hospital or public health services devoted to the black community that otherwise would be unavailable in an area where there were relatively few blacks. It is interesting to note that white infant mortality was also lower in areas with a larger percent black population. 12 We included a measure of the birth rate under the hypothesis that more births might raise the probability of infant deaths by increasing the number of infants at risk or by increasing pressure on the existing health-care network, holding other factors constant. The positive relationship is present for blacks in 1933-1935 and for whites in 1936 -1939, but in the remaining periods we could not reject the hypothesis of no effect.
We also included a series of state dummy variables to capture the effects of factors that were common to the counties in those states during that time period. Such factors might include state public health policies, cost of living differences, epidemics, and other factors. The results for all of the years show that there was substantial variation in infant mortality across the states, after holding the other factors constant. The differences across states were similar across time periods and races, as the correlations of the coefficients of the state dummies from the regressions for different time periods ranged from a low of 0.46 between the state coefficients in the black regressions for 1930 -1932 and 1933-1935 to a high of 0.72 between the black regressions for 1933-1935 and 1936 -1939 . The correlation of state coefficients across time in the white regressions ranged from a low of 0.3 between the white state coefficients in 1930 -1932 and in 1933-1935 to a high of 0.81 between the white state coefficients in 1933-1935 and 1936 -1939 . The correlation between the state coefficients in the black regressions and in the white regressions in the same year were relatively high at 0.78 in 1930 -1932, 0.57 in 1933-1935, and 0.44 in 1936 -1939 .
The cross-sectional regressions offer an initial look at the impact of key New Deal spending programs while controlling for differences in state policies. We 12 There might be a couple of explanations for this result. First, it might be that the reduction in infant mortality among blacks benefited whites by reducing the contagion of infant diseases, particularly in cases where black domestic servants were in daily contact with relatively high-income whites. A second potential explanation for why whites benefited when the black population was higher may be that income was distributed more unevenly in those counties. In other words, a relatively large black population in the South typically translated into relatively more farm tenants, sharecroppers, and wage laborers. Perhaps in such counties the white population was wealthier, which may have been manifest in lower infant mortality rates.
are hesitant to put much emphasis on the New Deal results from the crosssectional regressions because we believe that the inclusion of the state dummies has not fully controlled for unmeasured heterogeneity across counties in the sample. One reason to report the cross-sectional results is to show how some of the statistical inferences change when we switch to a difference method that controls for unmeasured factors that are constant for each county over the years but vary across counties. The results in Tables 4 and 5 show that among the relief programs, the CWA was associated with statistically significant reductions in infant mortality for blacks and whites, the FERA was associated with statistically insignificant increases in infant mortality for both races, and the WPA lowered infant mortality for both blacks and whites, although statistically significant only for whites. The Social Security Administration's Aid to Dependent Children program was associated with large reductions in infant mortality for blacks and whites, but we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect. The PWA's public housing program, later under the U.S. Housing Administration, also lowered infant mortality. The PWA sewer projects and other public works projects had statistically insignificant and small effects in 1933-1935 and then was associated with lower infant mortality, particularly for whites, in 1936 -1939. Finally, the AAA funds distributed to farmers in Rental and Benefit payments and later as Conservation payments were associated with higher levels of infant mortality for both blacks and whites in both 1933-1935 and 1936 -1939. Although we have controlled for differences in state policy in the crosssectional regressions, there still may have been unmeasured heterogeneity across counties that we have not controlled for at this point. Even within the same state there may have been social differences in the birthing and raising of children across counties. There certainly were unmeasured differences in the extent and reach of county health programs, and we can anticipate that epidemics or drought conditions hit some counties in the same state harder than others. Therefore, we analyzed the data again in difference form to try to control for the unmeasured factors that remained the same over the two time periods in each county but differed across counties. There are two sets of difference regressions, one set focuses on the difference between infant mortality and the independent variables between the periods 1930 -1932 and 1933-1935 and the other focuses on the differences between the periods 1930 -1932 and 1936 -1939 . The two sets of difference regressions contain different lists of New Deal programs because programs like the FERA and the CWA essentially terminated by the end of 1935, while other programs were started after 1935. Some programs like the AAA covered both periods.
In the difference regressions the differences in the percent black, illiterate, rural nonfarm, urban, and foreign-born between 1930 -1932 and 1933-1935 and between 1930 -1932 and 1936 -1939 As is typically the case, the R 2 values and adjusted R 2 values are substantially lower in the difference regressions reported in Tables 6 and 7 than in the  cross-sectional regressions in Tables 4 and 5 . In the cross-sectional regressions, illiteracy, percent black, percent urban, and percent rural nonfarm had strong and statistically significant effects. In the difference regressions, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect. There are two potential reasons for the difference in these effects. One possibility is that the illiteracy, urbanization, and percent black coefficients in the cross-section regressions were correlated with unmeasured features, like sanitation and public health programs, that influenced infant mortality. Thus, the coefficients in the cross-section regressions might have reflected the bias of omitting the unmeasured variables. A second possibility is that there was very little variation in the percent illiterate, percent urban, and percent black Source. See Table 3 and the discussion of the New Deal instruments in the text. Note. The t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors using White's (1980 ) method. between 1930 . The correlations between 1930 for the sample of 722 counties was 0.99 for percent black, 0.84 for percent illiterate, 0.97 for percent urban, 0.97 for percent foreign-born, and 0.92 for percent rural nonfarm. Thus, much of the variation in the cross section for these variables is eliminated by the differencing method.
When looking at the impact of the New Deal, however, we can eliminate the second possibility that there was little variation in New Deal spending because there was no spending until 1933 in the programs we examine and the amounts spent varied tremendously across counties. Therefore, the primary reason for differences between the econometric results for the cross sections and the difference regressions for the New Deal program will be driven by our controls for unmeasured heterogeneity across counties in the difference regressions.
In the early New Deal the FERA and CWA were the major relief programs. Spending on the FERA, which primarily ran from 1933 through 1935, lowered black infant mortality by a statistically significant 1.13 infant deaths per 1000 births for every per capita dollar spent. A one-standard-deviation increase in per Source. See Table 3 and the discussion of the New Deal instruments in the text. Note. The t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors using White's (1980) method. capita FERA spending of $17.35 would have been associated with a reduction in black infant mortality of nearly 20 deaths per 1000, which would have cut the black infant mortality rate to nearly the level of white infant mortality. Spending on the FERA also had a negative effect on white infant mortality, but the effect was much smaller and not statistically significant.
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The reductions in infant mortality associated with FERA spending were somewhat offset by increases in infant mortality associated with Civil Works Administration spending on work relief between November 1933 and April 1934. In the difference regressions in Table 7 , the CWA effect is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level for both blacks and whites. Further, CWA spending had a larger effect on black infant mortality than on white infant mortality.
The WPA, the major work relief program of the later New Deal, had a statistically insignificant and small negative effect on black infant mortality and a positive and statistically significant effect on white infant mortality. The difference in the impact between the FERA, the CWA, and the WPA may have been driven by the explicit goals of the programs. The FERA had both direct relief and work relief components to it, while the CWA was specifically focused on work relief. Williams (1968, pp. 120, 130) notes that the FERA used deficiencies in the families' budgets to determine the eligibility of recipients for either work or direct relief as well as the number of hours that recipients could work. Further, many of the FERA rules for projects and work opportunities limited relief opportunities for more highly skilled and employable workers, and thus targeted more low-income people. In contrast, even though the CWA was largely administered by FERA administrators, the CWA basically followed the rules established for work on PWA projects, and half of the CWA workers, though unemployed, were without relief status. When the WPA was established in the latter half of 1935, the WPA explicitly focused on work relief and left responsibility for the "unemployables" to state and local governments. Families with an employable member, even if unemployed at the time, were likely to have more resources than those eligible for direct relief. Thus, it appears that the FERA offered more benefits to the types of families with the least resources, and thus, the funds were directed to families where infant health was likely most threatened.
The Public Works Administration was less oriented toward work relief than the building of public works projects, which included a significant number of sewage treatment plants in smaller cities. The PWA has a negative and statistically significant effect on black infant mortality in both time periods, and the effect strengthens over time. An additional dollar of PWA spending in 1933-1935 was associated with a statistically significant reduction of about one-third of a death per 1000 births in black infant mortality. The effect is even stronger in 1936 -1939 at a reduction of 0.8 of a death per 1000 births. In both periods the PWA had a small negative and statistically insignificant association with white infant mortality. The t-tests in the black minus white regressions imply that the PWA had a more beneficial impact on infant mortality for blacks than for whites. The strength of the PWA effect is probably more from the building of sewage facilities and other public works than from the work relief provided. The PWA tended to be more focused on skilled workers, whose families were more likely to be at income levels where the risk of infant mortality was diminished. In fact, the stronger reductions in infant mortality in 1936 -1939 than in 1933-1935 are consistent with a strong lagged effect of the PWA. The effects of better sanitation and public works were not likely to take effect until the later period, after the projects had been finished and put into operation. The results here are also consistent with earlier results by Werner Troesken, who found that black mortality due to typhoid and other water-borne diseases was sharply reduced by the development of public water treatment plants at the turn of the century (Troesken, 1999) .
At the end of 1935 the Public Works Administration began building a series of public housing projects for the poor that were later administrated by the U.S. Housing Administration. Although these public housing projects have marred reputations today, projects like Techwood in Atlanta and projects in Birmingham appeared more promising when new. While we would anticipate that improved housing for the poor would reduce infant mortality, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect in the difference regressions. It may have been that the housing was not sufficiently better to have made a difference. It is possible that New Deal administrators chose families to live in the new projects with an eye toward ensuring the success of the project and thus did not populate them with the types of families for whom infant mortality was a problem. Or dislocations from the housing torn down to build the new housing might have offset any salutary effects.
The Social Security Administration's aid to dependent children (ADC) program was the primary program in the later New Deal targeted specifically for children. The impact of ADC spending was negative, although not statistically significant, for whites, and positive and large, but statistically insignificant, for blacks. We have no definitive explanation for why ADC spending did not lower infant mortality for either blacks or whites. The amount spent per person was small relative to the relief programs, and most of the spending came late in the New Deal, after the long-term downward trend for infant mortality had been reestablished.
The major agricultural spending program we examine is the Agricultural Adjustment Administration's payments to farmers. Although the AAA payments were supposed to go to farm owners, croppers, and tenants, Warren Whatley (1983) has suggested that the owners relegated a number of tenants and croppers to wage labor status, as they sought to obtain a larger share of the AAA payments for themselves. Thus, even though the AAA brought more income into the counties, there is the possibility that the AAA may have engendered an income redistribution that left croppers and tenants in a worse income position than before. The results here are consistent with this hypothesis, particularly in the 1933-1935 period. In this period, AAA spending was associated with higher infant mortality for both blacks and whites. After the AAA was reorganized in response to the Supreme Court decision declaring the program unconstitutional, the effects on infant mortality are no longer statistically significant in either the black or white regressions. The absence of the effect in the 1936 -1939 period may have been the result of a change in the attentiveness of the AAA to protecting tenant rights. Whatley (1983, p. 927) claims that by 1936 and 1938 the share of benefits going to tenants had increased, thus lower-income groups might have shared in the benefits of the AAA, which in turn would have meant the AAA would have helped contribute to lowering infant mortality. Another possible interpretation of the results is that the damage to croppers and tenants had already been done in the earlier period, so the AAA neither degraded the situation further nor made it better.
In comparisons of the cross-sectional regressions and the difference regressions, we see some substantial swings in the estimated coefficients on the New Deal programs. The most striking are the reversal of the effect of the CWA from lowering infant mortality to raising it and the switch from a strong lowering effect of the PWA/USHA housing projects to a statistically insignificant effect. There was also a switch in sign for the ADC coefficient in the black regressions, although none of the coefficients in the tables were statistically significant. We believe that the changes in the results as we move from the cross-sectional to the difference analysis are the result of inadequate accounting for unmeasured heterogeneity across counties in the cross-sectional regressions.
So what was the source of this heterogeneity? There appears to have been a negative omitted-variables bias. We are looking for unmeasured factors that would have been negatively associated with lower infant mortality but at the same time positively correlated with per capita spending on the CWA, the ADC, and PWA/USHA. We can only speculate, but one possible factor is the variation in the strength of local relief networks. Williams (1968) and Howard (1943) argue that there was substantial variation in the strength and extent of local relief networks. The networks were an agglomeration of people, churches, private groups, and local government programs. The stronger and more established local relief networks were in a better position to seek out families and help them obtain access to benefits. Such help would be extremely important in notifying families of the possibilities of new programs like the ADC program. These networks also played an important role in creating and lobbying for projects to attract more New Deal funds. These more established and successful groups might have already had more success in combating problems that led to infant mortality and at the same time may have had more success in helping families obtain funds and in attracting New Deal projects. The combination potentially creates the negative correlation with infant mortality and the positive association with New Deal funds that led to the negative bias in the cross-sectional regressions.
The FERA situation is one where there was a swing from essentially no effect on infant mortality to a negative and statistically significant one. This swing suggests a positive bias in the FERA coefficient that might have been driven by unmeasured factors that are positively associated with the FERA as well as with infant mortality. Given that the FERA spending included direct relief to families with "unemployable" household heads, it is possible that FERA spending was targeted at long-term pockets of poverty. Such pockets of poverty might have gone unmeasured by an average income proxy like retail sales per capita, which captures the average in the county but not a highly unequal distribution of income that might be associated with a significant group with high incomes and another group with low incomes. Thus, the combination of a long-term pocket of poverty attracting FERA funds and the association of higher infant mortality with such poverty in the county might have led to a positive bias in the FERA coefficient in the cross-sectional regressions.
Although the coefficients for blacks and whites have been discussed separately, one of the issues we would like to address is the difference in access to New Deal funds for blacks and whites. Our metric here is the comparisons of how black and white infant mortality responded to New Deal programs. The far right columns of Tables 6 and 7 report the results of estimating a difference-in-difference analysis for blacks and whites. The dependent variable is the difference in black infant mortality rates minus the difference in white infant mortality rates. The advantage of the difference-in-difference analysis is that the t-tests on the per capita New Deal spending coefficients are direct statistical tests of the hypothesis that the impact on black and white infant mortality was the same. The results suggest that all but two of the programs were at worst nondiscriminatory and sometimes even benefited black families more than white families, at least from the perspective of infant mortality. The FERA and the PWA appear to have reduced infant mortality more for blacks than for whites. We cannot reject the hypothesis of no difference in the effects of the AAA and the WPA. The CWA was associated with even higher infant mortality for blacks than for whites, although it was unexpected to see a positive association for both.
The difference in the effect of ADC was statistically significant and more positive for blacks than for whites. On the other hand, the ADC coefficient in the black-white difference equation in Table 6 is positive and statistically significant. This finding is consistent with Robert Lieberman's (1998, pp. 118 -120) and Richard Sterner's (1943, pp. 281-285) findings that blacks had less access to ADC benefits than did poor whites and that blacks received lower amounts per child on average. Yet this is an odd situation because whites appear to have received a greater share of the ADC benefits, yet the infant mortality rates of whites were not reduced much if at all by additional spending on aid to dependent children.
CONCLUSIONS
During the worst depression in American economic history, black and white infant mortality rates continued to decline except for a slight blip upward in [1933] [1934] . Normally, we might anticipate that such a large economic dislocation that lasted a decade would have manifested itself in a more substantial rise in infant mortality rates. The results of our analysis suggest that the New Deal had a mixed effect on the secular decline in infant mortality rates. The combination of direct relief and work relief administered by the FERA was associated with lower infant mortality. The PWA programs appear to have lowered infant mortality through the building of large numbers of sewage facilities throughout the United States and by providing extra employment in communities. Not all of the relief programs were associated with lower infant mortality, however. The focus of the CWA and the WPA on "employables" may have limited the impact of work relief on infant mortality. Neither Aid to Dependent Children nor the PWA Housing projects had any statistically measurable effect.
On the other hand, the AAA, which put substantial amounts of income into the hands of farmers, was associated with higher infant mortality. The incentives established by the AAA, which led landowners to transfer the status of tenants and croppers to wage workers, may have led to a decline in income for some families that increased the likelihood of infant mortality.
It is important to note, however, that over the course of the decade infant mortality continued to follow a long-term trend that had been established in earlier decades. Despite the small jumps upward in 1933 and 1934, the decline in infant mortality proceeded at a fairly rapid pace through the end of the decade. Thus, the specific New Deal programs that had had some success in contributing to the reductions in infant mortality were only a subset of the factors that explain the continued decline.
Several New Deal agencies claimed that they sought to avoid racial discrimination in the provision of employment and benefits. On the other hand, scholars such as Joseph Lieberman (1998) have argued that some programs, largely run by administrators from the local community, appear to have been actively discriminating against blacks. Our metric for testing the extent of discrimination was to determine the relative impact of the programs on infant mortality for blacks and whites. Many of the programs appear to have been nondiscriminatory. Some, like the FERA's combination of direct and work relief and the PWA's sanitation works and other public works, even lowered black infant mortality more than they lowered white infant mortality. On the other hand, the CWA work relief programs and the relief to children under the Social Security Administration's ADC program seem to have been associated with relatively higher infant mortality for blacks and whites. In the final analysis we cannot say that the New Deal as a whole was discriminatory or nondiscriminatory. Any effects describing the aggregate New Deal would cover the differences that we see program by program.
